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This Article explores how language and education have featured in half a century of 
armed ethnic conflict in Myanmar (Burma), how these issues feature in the on-going 
peace process, and how an exploration of key actors’ positions in relation to language 
and education can help to better understand the underlying dynamics of conflict, and 
the still highly contested peace process. Given the salience of ethno-linguistic 
diversity in Myanmar (Smith 1999, South 2008), studies of the politics of language 
are surprisingly thin on the ground. (Important exceptions include Callahan 2003, 
Salem-Gervais & Metro 2012, Lall and South 2013). While the complex and fast-
changing peace process in Myanmar, which emerged in late 2011, has yet to generate 
much scholarly analysis, commentary and policy literatures have largely bypassed the 
relationship between language, education and state-society and armed conflicts, and 
their resolution. 
 
Thus far, those engaged in the broader movement of political reform in Myanmar 
have largely addressed education and peace-building as separate issues; likewise, 
state, international (donor) and other actors in the peace process have mostly ignored 
issues of language and education. This article explores the relationships between 
education and language policy and practice, and armed conflict and - more recently - 
the peace process in Myanmar. We focus on the state education system, and education 
regimes under the authority of three major Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs) - one of 
which (the New Mon State Party: NMSP) has maintained a ceasefire with the 
government since 1995, one (the Kachin Independence Organisation: KIO) which saw 
its 17 year ceasefire collapse in 2011, and the third (the Karen National Union: KNU), 
which in early 2012 agreed a preliminary ceasefire, following more than half-a-
century of armed conflict. Analysing these two contrasted case studies (and 
addressing the situation of other ethnic communities, as necessary and in order to 
provide context) allows us to draw out questions regarding the relationship between 
ethnic nationality communities and the state, concluding that a sustainable resolution 
to Myanmar’s long-standing ethnic conflicts will be difficult to achieve without 
education reform that addresses the right language policies. 
 
The article is based on background data collected over a period of 9 months of 
fieldwork in 2011.1 The results of this research were published (Lall and South 2014) 
and as the peace process gathered pace and increased in complexity the team decide 
to return to the field in 2015.2 Data was collected in Mon, Karen and Kachin States, 
and the team spoke to 55 people and conducted 21 focus groups and larger meetings 
with stakeholders from EAGs, EAG education departments, ethnic political parties 
and local civil society groups (including ethnic NGOs). In addition teachers, parents 
and students at ethnic schools were either interviewed or took part in focus groups.3  
 
 
                                                        
1 The 2011 research was funded by the PERI fund of OSI.  
2 The 2015 research was funded by DAI (USAID). 
3 Given the sensitive nature of the research, and at the request of several interlocutors, the team cannot divulge the 
names of these individuals or organisations. 
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The conflict nexus and the peace process; Language rights, and the politics of 
education  
 
Myanmar is home to more than 100 ethno-linguistic groups, with a population of over 
51 million. Non-Burman communities make up at least 30% of the population.  
 
In the lead-up to independence in 1948, ethnic nationality elites mobilised 
communities in order to gain access to political and economic resources, demanding 
justice and fair treatment for the groups they sought to represent. The KNU went 
underground in January 1949, initiating more than six decades of (mostly 'low 
intensity') civil war. The ensuring armed conflict was marked by serious and 
widespread human rights abuses on the part of both the Myanmar Army and – less 
systematically – EAGs. Myanmar's ethnic insurgents have been fighting to achieve 
political self-determination, which in recent years has been framed as a desire for 
federal autonomy within a multi-ethnic Union (Smith 1999); unsurprisingly, after half 
a century of armed conflict, there are also significant political-economic agendas at 
play in Myanmar's armed conflict, and peace process.  
 
For decades, communist and dozens of ethnic insurgents controlled large parts of the 
country. Since the 1970s however, armed opposition groups have lost control of their 
once extensive 'liberated zones’, precipitating humanitarian and political crises in the 
borderlands. A previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s brought respite to conflict-
affected civilian populations, and provided the space for civil society networks to (re-) 
emerge within, and between, ethnic nationality communities. However, the then-
military government proved unwilling to accept EAGs’ demands for substantial 
political negotiations. Therefore, despite some positive developments, the ceasefires 
of the 1990s did not dispel distrust between ethnic nationality communities and the 
government (South 2008).  
 
A new phase in the peace process began in late 2011, under the military-. backed, 
semi-civilian government of U Thein Sein. Preliminary ceasefires were agreed with 
most (but not all) of Myanmar's EAGs, and some progress was made towards 
negotiating a comprehensive Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). At the time of 
writing however, progress seems to have stalled, with significant differences 
remaining between EAGs and the government (and particularly Myanmar Army) on a 
range of issues, including Security Sector Reform, and how to decide the future 
political make-up of the country. With elections scheduled for November 2015, it 
seems unlikely that the peace process as currently configured will result in a 
comprehensive settlement. Myanmar's next government will have a packed agenda, 
and may not prioritise the peace process in the same way as its predecessor. The 
concerns and aspirations of ethnic nationality communities will not go away, but the 
opportunity to address these through a structured peace process may be diminishing. 
Although, at the time of writing, election campaigning had not yet begun, the 
country's two main political parties - the governing Union Solidarity and Government 
Party (USDP), and opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) - have 
demonstrated limited interest in mother tongue schooling and ethnic education. 
Ethnic-based political parties did relatively well in the 2010 elections, but will 
struggle to prevail in 2015, against the well-resourced USDP and the highly popular 
NLD (or at least its leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi). Therefore, while ethnic political 
parties are important champions for mother tongue and ethnic education in Myanmar, 
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EAGs and civil society actors are likely to remain key actors in this field - despite the 
uncertain progress of the peace process. 
 
Meanwhile on the ground, the peace process is seen by some stakeholders as a vehicle 
for the expansion of militarised state structures into conflict-affected areas, where the 
government is experienced by local communities as illegitimate, predatory and 
violent. This is the case also in the field of education. 
 
The right to ‘mother tongue’ language education has been at the heart of Myanmar’s 
prolonged state-society and armed ethnic conflicts. At a minimum, ethnic nationalists 
have demanded the teaching of minority languages in schools (including state 
schools); a stronger version of this position is to demand teaching of the curriculum in 
the mother tongue (at least through primary schooling). Positions in relation to 
language use (in schooling, and more broadly in public administration) can provide a 
mapping of ethnic nationalist elites’ (civil society actors, political parties, and 
particularly EAGs) positions, vis-à-vis conflicts in Myanmar more broadly. The stated 
positions, and practices, of key stakeholders (e.g. EAGs, and affiliated and associated 
education actors) derive from and reflect (and to a degree inform) identities, interests 
and positions in the broader peace process. Different actors’ positions on the 
relationship between EAG education systems and those of the state (as discussed 
below), and demands regarding the use of ethnic nationality languages in (for 
example) the administration of government and justice, can be seen as proxies 
indicating how stakeholders consider that Myanmar's ethnic communities should 
relate to the state - revealing a continuum of positions, from unitary state-led 
assimilation of minority communities, through varying types of federalism, towards 
outright secession and independence for ethnic polities. 
 
Thus, language policies are not linked only to learning and cognition in schools. In 
many developing countries, especially nations made up of diverse ethnic groups and 
subject to state-society (including armed) conflict, there tends to be a concern among 
state authorities that promotion of minority languages and ethnic identities will lead to 
greater divisiveness (the literature is discussed below). Government and non-state 
educational regimes often use language policy to serve an instrumental purpose, such 
as building a national identity. This can discriminate against ‘others’, including 
vulnerable minority groups, and can lead to resentment, resistance and conflict. 
Education and language use in these cases underpins, and even causes conflict 
between the majority and minority groups. 
 
In Myanmar, half a century of military rule (between 1962-2011) saw the 
consolidation of state power under a regime identified with the Bamar (Burman) 
ethnic majority, which makes up about 60% of the population (Houtman 1999). 
During this period, Burmese (the majority language) became the sole language of 
governance and education, with ethnic minority (or ‘ethnic nationality’, as many 
groups prefer to be designated) languages suppressed and marginalised. The 
perceived ‘Burmanisation’ of state and society has constituted one of the prime 
grievances of ethnic nationality elites, which have mobilised minority communities to 
resist militarised central government authority, in the context of the world’s most 





Language, education and conflict literatures, in the Myanmar context 
Education is often projected as a panacea to conflict. However, a limited set of 
literature engages with how education is not only a (potential) part of the solution, but 
often a part of the problem as well. Smith & Vaux (2003: 2) develop Bush and 
Saltarelli’s analysis (2000) to reflect on the role of education in “political and social 
processes”, stressing the “active rather than passive role” (2004: 19) that education 
plays in causing conflict. Smith & Vaux (2003) also examine key aspects of education 
systems that can be implicated in the push towards, or pull from, conflict.  This is a 
useful structure when looking at how education in Myanmar has contributed to 
conflict. 
 
Curriculum: particularly the way in which it deals with issues of identity - e.g. 
language, religion or culture. Both the Myanmar government and some EAG 
education departments have used the curriculum as a political tool to shape identities 
(see below). In fact, many young Bamar think that in order to be Myanmar you have 
to be a Buddhist - a result of that legacy. (Lall et al. 2014) 
 
Language: “The role and status of [minority] languages … may lead to tensions” 
(Smith & Vaux 2003: 29). By banning the use of ethnic languages in state schools in 
the 1960s, the government set the scene for major grievances that fed into the conflict 
between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) and EAGs, and the broader ethno-
nationalist community. To this day, the status of ethnic nationality languages in state 
schools remains fiercely debated. 
 
Religion: Tensions can arise over state funding of religious schools, the unequal 
provision of resources to schools serving different faiths or denominations, or the 
reinforcement of a sense of difference or even antipathy. The Myanmar government 
has not supported religious schools as such, although more recently the Ministry for 
Religious Affairs has helped with teacher salaries at Monastic schools. Monastic 
schools, however, accept children from other religions, in addition to the Theravada 
Buddhist faith of the majority population. 4  Historically, religion has not featured 
significantly in armed ethnic conflicts in Myanmar (beyond the case of Kachin State, 
where insurgency broke out in the early 1960s, in response to government’s 
sponsorship of Buddhism as the state religion: Smith 1999). However, given the 
changing scenario with regard to the sangha’s (Buddhist monkhood’s) voice and 
positions on identity, and the recent upsurge in popular Buddhist nationalism (and 
anti-Muslim violence) in Myanmar and the region, issues of religion and religious 
education seem increasingly to be implicated in conflicts in Myanmar. 
 
Culture, History, Geography: What form of ‘national identity’ is presented through 
these subjects?  Are differing perspectives represented or subordinated? As discussed 
above, history and geography to date have not been context specific, and children in 
government schools in ethnic states only learn history as seen through a Bamar lens. 
 
Resources, Textbooks, Media: Referring to the political/ideological messages that are 
being promoted through textbooks,- which have for decades emphasised the martial 
tradition, nationalism and militarism , portrayed as essentially linked to a Bamar 
identity (Lall, M. and Hla Hla Win 2013), targeted at the ethnic minorities, as a form 
                                                        




of attempted assimilation. 
 
Teachers, Teacher Education and Teaching Methods: As teachers are central to 
education systems, the transmission of the curriculum is affected by the way the 
teacher teaches. Having mainly Bamar government teachers in government school in 
ethnic states is likely to have contributed to the widespread sense of alienation felt 
among minority communities. However, no on the ground research has been done on 
this. 
 
Peace Education: Referring “to the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, 
attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children 
youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural” (UNICEF 
working paper, cited in Smith & Vaux, 2003). There has been no formal (and little 
informal) peace education in Myanmar to date, with few programs emphasising 
community cohesion. Whilst such developments may emerge as a part of the reform 
process underway in Myanmar, they are not as yet in place. Under decades of military 
rule, people living in government-controlled parts of the country were denied access 
to reliable news, or impartial assessments of conflict issues. Indeed, Bamar-majority 
communities often have little understanding of the realities experienced by their 
ethnic minority brethren, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Given their lack of 
information regarding ethnic aspirations and grievances, there is a risk of Bamar-
majority communities being mobilised by unscrupulous politicians to oppose possible 
political changes in Myanmar (e.g. re-structuring the state along more federalist 
lines), as a result of negotiations related to the peace process. Widespread anti-
Muslim prejudice and violence has demonstrated the propensity of elements of the 
Buddhist-Bamar majority to being mobilised “in defence of race and religion”. Thus 
the importance of peace education, in order to prepare the majority community for 
possible socio-political (and political-cultural) changes in the context of the peace 
process. 
 
Educational reforms and structural adjustment: Smith & Vaux (2003: 36) propose a 
Sector Wide Approach to educational reform that is based on a “comprehensive 
overview and conflict analysis of the whole education sector”. Whilst an education 
review is in place in Myanmar, and is likely to lead to education reform, this process 
has not been inclusive of the ethnic minority education groups. There has been no 
engagement with the issue of conflict within this review. 
 
The 2011 Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2011a) summarises what has plagued 
Myanmar’s education system for 6 decades: “Schools as a vehicle for social division” 
(2011a: 167), through the imposition of a dominant language, the manipulation of 
textbooks to encourage intolerance, the championing of a culture of violence, and 
segregation.  
 
However, schools are not the only vehicle through which conflict has been fuelled. 
Brown (2011) describes education’s structural and socio-economic influence on 
conflict, whereby inequalities between groups are created and maintained, and the 
political effect whereby divisions are reinforced through segregation and political 
exclusion of particular groups. He mentions the issue of education raising aspirations 




Brock (2011: 29) recognises the “potential for education to exacerbate the endemic 
cultural conflict that is inherent in the human species”.  He differentiates between 
‘conflict within education’ and ‘education within conflict’. Conflict within education 
(Brock, 2011) refers to the struggle over political control of what happens in schools.  
Brock cites several ways in which education systems themselves become sites of 
conflict, including disputes over language of instruction. As discussed below, in the 
context of the peace process, education in Myanmar has become a site of contest, with 
state and non-state actors competing for authority over teaching institutions and 
curricula, especially in armed conflict-affected areas. 
 
‘Education within conflict’ (Brock, 2011) refers to the contribution that education 
makes towards creating and sustaining conflict - e.g. through the manipulation of 
curricula to promote jingoism or ethnic hatred.  Both state and non-state curricula in 
Myanmar have contributed towards “othering” of enemy communities and structures, 
exacerbating and deepening identity conflicts. He also examines education and 
conflict in the broader sense of the term by exploring ‘education and socio-cultural 
violence’, by which he refers to the symbolic violence imposed on women by 
patriarchal oppression and ‘education and environmental conflict’ i.e. the role that 
education has in creating or resolving conflict that human beings have with their 
environment. 
 
The UNESCO Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2011a: 131) recognises the role 
that education can have in contributing to conflict; “Education systems do not cause 
wars.  But under certain conditions they can exacerbate the wider grievances, social 
tensions and inequalities that drive societies in the direction of violent conflict”. 
While acknowledging that education can and does contribute to conflict (Chapter 3), 
the 2011 Global Monitoring Report   also acknowledges the role that education has in 
peace-building (Chapter 5). It identifies a number of dimensions, including through 
mother-tongue education and the acceptance and use of minority languages in schools 
(2011a: 241-42), the reform of history and religion curricula to represent multiple 
perspectives (242-45), developing inclusive curricula for peace and citizenship 
education (245-46), integrating children from different groups into multi-ethnic/faith 
schools (246), devolving school governance (246-248) and ensuring that schools 
themselves are free from violence (248-49). Clearly whilst education has been part of 
the conflict scene, it now needs to be a part of peace-building in Myanmar - a 
platform where government and EAG can come together and build something new. 
 
 
Language rights and education before 2011  
For decades, the Myanmar state education system has insisted on Bama saga 
(Burmese) being used through a national school system, to create a Myanmar national 
identity based on Bamar culture, with Burmese as a ‘‘‘unifying’’’ language (Callahan 
2003, Watkins in Simpson 2007). Given the diversity of ethno-linguistic groups in 
Myanmar, there is a strong argument for the country having a ‘lingua franca’ or 
Union language.5 However, the promotion of Burmese as a national language under 
the previous military government has not led to an inclusive national identity, as 
ethnic groups were still discriminated against, and the ‘national identity’ that was 
promoted was strongly identified with the Bamar majority ethnic group (Houtman 
                                                        




1999). Bush and Saltarelli (2000: vii) examine both “the constructive and destructive 
impacts of education”: how it both can contribute to, and/or mitigate violence and 
conflict.  Education contributes conflict, not only through the unequal distribution of 
education among ethnic groups but also through educational policies that undermine 
or even erase a particular culture, particularly through the imposition of a dominant 
language as language of instruction. The perceived forced assimilation policy of 
‘Burmanisation’ was greatly resented by most ethnic stakeholders, and drove waves 
of ethnic minority citizens into revolt against the government - further polarising and 
propagating armed conflicts across the country. 
 
In contrast to formal (state-controlled) schooling, ethnic nationality civil society 
actors in government-controlled areas - particularly faith-based networks (e.g. Karen 
and Kachin Christian churches; Mon and Shan Buddhist monasteries) - have long 
struggled to provide ethnic language teaching outside of school hours, often in 
informal settings under threat of state suppression (South 2008, Lall and South 2013). 
Various ethnic literature and culture committees (some of which were established in 
the 1950s, although most of these were semi-dormant in subsequent decades), 
supported the expansion of ethnic language literacy programs in the 1990s. Although 
these (Shan, Mon, Karen, PaO etc) groups have done much help to keep ethnic culture 
alive, they cannot substitute for regular (formal) schooling.  In areas more directly 
affected by armed conflict, and particularly in EAG-controlled zones in the 
borderlands, non-state actors developed their own education regimes. Some were 
fairly closely modelled on the state school system curriculum, whereas others 
developed along separate (indeed, particularly from the 1960s through the 1970s, 
separatist) lines, using mother tongue education to promote and reinforce ethnic 
nationality ethnic identities, and opposition to the militarised state. It is important to 
note that the various EAG education systems differ markedly from each other, both in 
terms of the language they use but also based on what curriculum they chose to teach. 
 
Ceasefires in Mon and Kachin states – parallel mother tongue education with links to 
the state system 
The KIO and NMSP agreed ceasefires with the then military government in the mid-
1990s. For a decade and a half, both groups maintained an uneasy truce, which 
allowed for the limited rehabilitation of conflict-affected communities and the (re-) 
emergence of rich civil society networks, within and between ethnic nationality 
communities in Myanmar. Most commentators have regarded the ceasefires of the 
1990s in Myanmar as a failure, as they did not result in political negotiations to 
address the social, political, economic and cultural issues underlying decades of 
armed conflict in the country. Nevertheless, in the context of the previous round of 
ceasefires, the KIO and NMSP (and some other groups) expanded their already 
existing education networks, to provide mother tongue teaching to children in their 
areas of control (‘ceasefire zones’) and in adjacent government-controlled areas. The 
EAG-aligned education providers, like the Mon (NMSP Education Department: Mon 
National Education Committee/Department) and the Kachin (KIO Education 
Department) have used the government curriculum in translation, combined with 
additional elements teaching ethno-national history and the mother tongue. Their 
schools allow for children to learn Burmese as they grow older, so that they can join 
the government education system either at middle or high school level, and then go on 
to state tertiary education institutes, if they so wish (and can afford to). Whilst 
primary school education is conducted in the mother tongue, and older students 
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continue to study their mother tongue and ethnic history alongside the Myanmar 
national curriculum, these groups generally perceive the value in an education system 
that does not separate and isolate their young people from the rest of the country. The 
Mon national schools represent a positive conceptualisation of the relationship 
between a locally owned and implemented education system which preserves and 
reproduces ethnic national identity and language, and linkages to the central 
government/Union education system. As such, the Mon national education system 
may be seen as an incipient approach to building federalism in Myanmar, ‘from 
below’ - or from the bottom, up. 
 
Continued conflict in Karen state – parallel mother tongue education with a 
separatist identity 
The main Karen armed group - the KNU - did not agree a ceasefire in the 1990s. The 
Karen education system, which for understandable historical reasons has evolved as a 
more-or-less separate regime, producing graduates (many of whom actually studied in 
refugee camp schools, in neighbouring Thailand) who are being educated into 
(virtual) citizens of a putative Karen free state (Kawthoolei), rather than of the Union 
of Myanmar. This means that they are unable to reintegrate into the Myanmar 
government education system. The KNU education system emphasises a clearly 
articulated Karen (separatist?) identity, with regard to the Bamar-dominated society. 
Karen national school graduates tend to speak little Burmese, and while they may be 
exposed to high quality teaching (in at least some schools), this cohort receives 
qualifications that are not recognised in Myanmar or any other country. Although 
many Karen schools in conflict-affected (and especially in government-controlled) 
areas in practice adopt ‘mixed’ curricula and teaching practices (Lall and South 
2013), the Karen national school system nevertheless represents an alternative model 
of ethnic nationality education in Myanmar, quite distinct from the state system.  
 
 
The new government and the reform process 
The election of a military-backed, semi-civilian government in November 2010 
represented a clear break with the past. The new government initiated a multipronged 
reform process that included reconciliation with the NLD, economic and education 
reforms as well as a peace process with the EAGs. In late 2011 and 2012, preliminary 
ceasefires were agreed between the government and most Ethnic Armed Groups 
(EAGs). The peace process has seen the lives of conflict-affected civilians undergo 
profound transformations for the better. The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI 
2014) conducted a ‘listening project’ with conflict-affected communities in remote 
parts of Myanmar, to listen to Karen, Mon and Karenni (Kayah) communities - 
particularly women - experiences before and after the ceasefires. Initial findings 
indicate that many people have benefited greatly from preliminary ceasefires between 
the government and the KNU, New Mon State Party and Karenni National 
Progressive Party. For example, before the KNU ceasefire, villagers often had to flee 
from fighting, and to avoid forced conscription and portering. Post-ceasefire, people 
report greatly decreased levels of fear. In some cases, displaced people are beginning 
to return to previous settlements and attempting to rebuild their lives. In many 
communities, livelihoods have improved as a result of villagers’ better access to their 
farms, and a reduction in predatory taxation. Nevertheless, civilians fear a breakdown 




To date questions of ethnic language and teaching regimes have not featured 
prominently in negotiations despite the fact that the use of mother tongue in schools 
in ethnic areas is one of the original grievances that fuelled the conflict. One reason 
why language and education issues have not featured significantly in the Myanmar 
peace process thus far, is because this has to date been a largely elite-driven exercise, 
involving the Myanmar government (more recently, with significant input from 
Myanmar Army) and EAGs - with little involvement from civil society groups or 
political parties, beyond networking and advocacy activities. As the peace process 
moves into next phase of widely anticipated political negotiations, discussions and 
demands regarding education and language use are likely to become more prominent 
within the peace process. 
 
However the government has already launched an education review and reform 
process that has been totally disconnected from the peace process. Ethnic educators 
have so far had had very little input into the education reform processes. The 
government started by increasing spending on education to around 5% of the 2013/14 
Union budget and increased teacher salaries (especially for those working in remote, 
conflict-affected areas) as well as providing direct small grants to schools for repairs. 
A new education ‘mother law’ was passed in parliament, resulting in mass protests on 
the streets by students who believe that the government retains too much control over 
education matters. Much of the education argument is around decentralisation and 
local power and whilst there has been some discussion around this, it remains unclear 
whether this will mean a fiscal decentralisation, and at what level (State/Region or 
Township) policy decisions will be made. 6  The hope is that if education policy 
decisions are decentralised to state governments to at least a limited level in the 
future, that state parliaments will be able to engender a debate on issues of language 
and culturally and context adapted curricula. Already, State/Region governments in a 
number of areas (Mon, Bago and Tanintharyi) have begun to introduce minority 
languages into government school curricula at the primary level. This has been as a 
result of pressure both at the Union level (from the executive, and particularly on the 
part of ethnic nationality parties in Parliament), and due to activism on the part of 
                                                        
6 November 2012 Draft Framework for Social and Economic Reforms (FESR), quoted below, indicates that the 
GOM plans to work with a distributed (or deconcentrated) model of education management. “GOM attaches high 
priority to developing a participatory process of local budgeting, which should reflect local priorities and needs 
while corresponding with national policy directions, by delegating decision-making authority over expenditure 
compositions (between recurrent and capital expenditure) as well as inter-sectoral allocations (between sectors) 
under the guidance of local parliaments. However, GOM still retains the budgetary controls over health and 
education expenditure for transitional adjustments, which may be a future subject of decision for fiscal 
decentralization. In the meantime, GOM plans to ensure that the initial imbalances of decentralization can be 
corrected through a gradual process of coordination and delegation, which can ultimately reinforce the legitimacy 
and capacity of the state and regional governments particularly for those that are contributing to parallel process 
of peacebuilding and regional development.” (FESR, November 2012 Draft, page 34, emphasis added) ...“While 
GOM strengthens regulatory policies to streamline various private and community-run educational programs, it is 
also moving ahead with the decentralization of education management in line with the requirements of the 
Constitution by integrating locally-designed teaching curriculum as well as non-formal programs in basic 
education system. This reform policy and strategy will focus on the need to expand the system of basic education 
from eleven to twelve years, on child-centred teaching methodologies, upgrading teacher training and other 
curriculum reforms necessary to enhance the quality of basic education, on teacher remuneration and broader 
issues of education financing, on establishing a rigorous system for education quality assessment and 
performance, and on further reforms in the management of basic education including the importance of active 
engagement in the process by the parents themselves. In addition, GOM will also pay attention to other supportive 
measures that can address high drop-out rates and out-of-pocket cost burdens on the families.” (FESR, November 




civil society and political parties at the State/Region level. However, such initiatives 
remain under-resourced, in terms of the availability of mother tongue-speaking 
teachers and funds to pay them, and in regard to the limited supply of quality teaching 
materials. In this context, there is a risk that state schools newly required to teach 
minority languages may ‘poach’ teachers from EAG and other locally owned and 
delivered education systems - a development which would exacerbate conflict, instead 
of than addressing one of the key grievances of ethnic communities. 
 
 
Language rights and education in the reform era  
At the time of writing, ethnic educators have yet to develop a common position 
regarding mother tongue usage in education, although such a policy might be 
emerging.7Given the difficulty which EAGs (which are often internally fragmented - 
along ideological, personality, clan-based and political-economic lines) have 
encountered in developing common positions and strategies to engage constructively 
with the government (in Myanmar Army) in the peace process, it is not surprising that 
diverse (and sometimes fractious) ethnic elites have yet to develop a coherent and 
comprehensive set of policies in relation to education. 
 
Most ethnic educators and political elites seem willing to acknowledge that Burmese 
(Bama saga) is and should continue to be a Union (national) language (perhaps 
together with English). They are though concerned that ethnic languages should be 
given equal status, particularly in ethnic nationality-populated areas (and especially 
the country’s seven ethnic States) - both in schooling, and in general administration. 
However, serious debates remain regarding the status of the languages, cultures (and 
by proxy, political legitimacy) of ‘minorities within minorities’ - such as for example 
the PaO in Shan State, Pwo (Ploung) and other Karen sub-groups, and the situation of 
Karen communities in Mon State and elsewhere (e.g. Bago and Irrawaddy Regions). 
It seems unlikely that well-established ethnic minority communities, some of which 
have historically experienced conflictual relationships with neighbouring (sometimes 
larger) ethnic nationality groups, would be willing to allow their ethnic brethrens’ 
language to become the dominant medium for schooling and/or governance, at the 
State-level - potentially consigning smaller minorities’ languages and cultures to 
further marginalisation. The gap is also wide on positions regarding the role of the 
state. Whilst some who teach the government curriculum would like to see some 
financial support from the state (without losing their autonomy), others do not want 
any association with the government education system at all. 
 
The role of renewed conflict in Kachin state – disengaging the education system from 
the state 
In June 2011 the KIO ceasefire broke down, leading to a return of widespread armed 
conflict, with associated human rights and population displacement. In consequence, 
the KIO education system has been disengaged from the state system, with Kachin 
nationalist educators now pursuing a more avowedly separatist agenda, similar to that 
which has characterised the KNU education regime. 
 
                                                        
7 ‘Its MINE: Indigenous groups claim their rights through new network for education in Myanmar’ (press release 
on International Mother Language Day, 21 February 2014). 
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Direct results of the conflict include a disengagement from the state system and a 
rejection of using Bama saga as a medium of instruction.8 Different Kachin groups 
are now actively involved in developing a new curriculum in Jingpaw that they feel is 
more appropriate for Kachin children. Content, language of instruction and teaching 
method are being changed in a process that sees educators develop the new 
curriculum as children progress through schools. Whilst there is an acknowledgement 
that the lack of accreditation will create a problem for students (in that they will no 
longer be able to move back into the Myanmar state system), the majority of those 
involved in education across Kachin State maintain that the quality of existing system 
is so low, that no parents would want their children to study at a Myanmar university 
anyway. Many also promise that solutions to those problem will be found in time. A 
few interlocutors acknowledge that the education reforms in Myanmar might result in 
a better system that the Kachin children should have access to, but these voices few, 
and generally many maintain that they do not trust the reforms will be successful, or if 
they are, relevant for Kachin students. 
 
The role of continued ceasefire in Mon state – rapprochement? 
Despite political difficulties, the NMSP ceasefire has persisted, and was renewed in 
February 2011. Although the current peace process in Myanmar remains problematic, 
the persistence of the NMSP ceasefire provided a unique space for the Mon education 
system to flourish. However, disappointed by a lack of donor support for a system 
widely regarded as a model of best practice for ethnic education schooling in 
Myanmar, NMSP educators are faced with a dilemma: whether to embrace a closer 
relationship with the (reforming) state education structure, or to follow the Kachin 
model, and retrench as separate education system. The government (at Union and 
Mon State levels) has recently passed legislation and made statements, allowing for 
and indeed encouraging mother tongue education in ethnic nationality-populated 
areas, at primary level. As state schools are not well equipped to deliver these services 
(lacking appropriate teaching materials, or qualified teachers), an opportunity exists 
for Mon educators to ‘fill the gap’, and receive state (and presumably 
donor/international) recognition and support for their work, ensuring the long-term 
viability of the Mon education system. The Mon nationalist community, generally 
wants the MNEC to remain independent of the state system during the transitional 
period of the peace process - only considering integration with the government school 
system a viable option after a comprehensive political settlement is agreed.  Although 
these issues and positions are contested, the majority of Mon nationalism and 
educators (including the MNEC) want to expand the use of Mon in government and 
‘mixed’ schools, and eventually see a structured interaction and convergence between 
state and non-state education systems. Unfortunately, donors to the peace process 
have been reluctant to support this model of best practice. 
 
Like KIO school graduates until the resumption of armed conflict in 2011, 10th 
Standard MNEC students can sit government matriculation exams, and join the Union 
higher education system (should they choose to do so, despite its faults). Thus, ethnic 
minority children receive the benefits of mother tongue schooling, but are still able to 
position themselves as citizens of a multi-ethnic Union (including through the 
possession of Burmese language skills). While Mon school system has retained these 
                                                        
8 This happens to be a ‘mutual rejection’ as the conflict has also resulted in a recent government decree refusing to 
let children from KIO administered schools transfer to government schools, something they had previously been 
able to do. 
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characteristics (despite the MNEC’s struggles to secure adequate funding), the 
breakdown of the KIO ceasefire in June 2011 has led to a dis-engagement between 
the Kachin and government school systems, in the context of significant alienation 
and anger on the part of the local community. Kachin education (including the KIO 
school system) seems to be diverging from the government system, and adopting 
some of the 'separatist' characteristics demonstrated by the Karen (KNU) system. 
 
The role of a new ceasefire in Karen state – ways forward? 
Meanwhile, the KNU and associated education actors are undergoing a profound 
review of their education experience and regimes. The KNU education system is a 
remarkable testimony to the resilience and commitment to education of Karen 
communities. Nevertheless, in order to be viable in the long term, this regime will 
need reforming, including particularly strategic re-imagining of the relationship 
between the Karen and state education regimes, in terms both of syllabus and 
administration. In the broader peace process, the KNU has been the most pro-active 
and creative of the nearly 20 Ethnic Armed Groups involved in peace talks with the 
government.  
 
As the political realities change on the ground, a few families have tried to relocate 
back from the camps and the border to government controlled areas. They have found 
it difficult to get their children into government schools due to a language barrier. 
Unsurprisingly the Karen families interviewed in a micro study9 said it depended 
upon the good will of the local head teacher and the patience of the teachers. The 
government administered placement tests were perceived as unfair to children who 
have studied a very different curriculum. At the time of writing a number of NGOs 
are trying to work with the government on a system that would allow children to 
transfer between systems and schools, although everyone is aware that there is a long 
way to go. 
 
In a positive development (which contrasts to the Kachin expense), Karen educators 
have in the context of the peace process begun to reconceptualise and negotiate the 
relationship between their schools and those of the state. On the ground, implicit and 
explicit contests are playing out between a state school system perceived as pushing 
into previously inaccessible, armed conflict-affected and ethnic nationality-populated 
areas, and a resilient and locally legitimate KNU-oriented school system. Scope exists 
within formal political negotiations in the peace process for a negotiated 
’convergence’ between the KNU and government school systems (Joliffe 2015). In 
order to be successful and comprehensive, such discussions should be explicitly 
included on the agenda of peace talks (perhaps in the forthcoming political dialogue 




Based on a combination of primary research and literature review, we have shown 
how language and education policy and practice are deeply implicated in ethnic 
conflicts in Myanmar. Since at least the advent of military rule in 1962, the state has 
been perceived - with justification - as pursuing a more-or-less explicit and conscious 
project of forced assimilation vis-a-vis the ethnic nationality communities. Ethnic 
                                                        
9 Small study and presentation by Save the Children, Myanmar Conference Chiang Mai July 2015 – need to get 
report from them. 
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nationality elites (EAGs and civil society actors) have resisted 'Burmanisation' 
through a number of strategies, including armed conflict, and the development of 
education regimes which preserve and reproduce their languages and cultures.  
 
The existence of EAG ethnic education systems demonstrates the importance which 
ethnic communities and leaders place on mother tongue education – their persistence 
and resilience ('social capital'). These systems were developed during years of 
protracted armed conflict, prior to ceasefires in Myanmar in the 1990s. In the context 
of their respective ceasefires (in 1994 and 1995), the KIO and NMSP expanded their 
education systems, achieving what might be considered a form of 'federalism from 
below' in Myanmar. Despite great difficulties in securing resources (both financial, 
and human), the KIO and NMSP school systems were locally owned and delivered, 
and supported mother tongue teaching, particularly at primary level. In the absence - 
until recently - the a Karen ceasefire, the KNU Education Department (with support 
from international NGOs) developed an impressive education system well-suited to 
local needs, which diverged significantly from the government system, not least 
through the promotion of Karen language and culture/identity, with only a limited 
focus on Burmese language (Bama saga). 
 
Through their promotion of local languages, these schools address one of the key 
demands of ethnic minority communities in Myanmar: the maintenance and teaching 
of ethnic languages, under conditions of local control and administration - i.e., self-
determination in the field of education. These struggles have significance beyond the 
fields of education and schooling. Positions in relation to language and education 
policy - including especially the appropriate medium/s of instruction - indicate (or 
reflect) the identities and interests of different stakeholders, in terms of the kind of 
country they imagine Myanmar to be, and via-a-vis the peace process. Debates 
regarding the status and future of ethnic education reveal positions regarding the 
appropriate relationships between State and Union governments and ethnic nationality 
polities. Since at least 1962, the government has sought to bring ethnic nationalities 
under direct central control, denying autonomy to ethnic communities, including in 
the fields of education and language use (or at least teaching in schools). In this 
historic context, where the military-dominated state has denied and suppressed 
demands for a federal settlement to Myanmar's state-society and ethnic conflicts, local 
efforts to promote self-determination in the field of education (using ethnic languages 
in schools, and administering locally-owned schools) have been perceived by the 
Bama-dominated government as acts of rebellion, tantamount to outright secession. 
However, the state's unwillingness to countenance the existence (let alone support the 
development) of locally owned education regimes may be changing. The Thein Sein 
government has been willing to envisage significant reforms in education, including 
elements of decentralisation. Discussion and reforms in regard to education policy 
and decentralisation have opened some space for mother tongue education in 
government schools - although not to the degree demanded by most ethnic and other 
education activists. What has not yet been considered in any depth however, is the 
relationship between state and non-state basic education provision in conflict-affected 
areas, and how this relates to the ongoing (if currently stalled) peace process. 
 
 





Ethnic nationalist (EAG, but also civil society and community-led) activities in the 
field of education are representative of broader struggles for self-determination. 
Ethnic responses to ‘Burmanisation’ and centralisation may be plotted along a 
continuum - ranging from demands for outright independence from a Union for which 
many ethnic people feel little sympathy (secession, or separatism), through varying 
forms of autonomy and decentralisation - varieties of (including ‘asymmetric’) 
federalism. At one end of this spectrum would be the 'Union Karen' (Thawnghmung 
2008, South 2008) and other ethnic groupings, which while self-identifying with their 
ethnic community, nevertheless feel a degree of fairly strong association with the 
Union. 
 
In relation to education, separatist agendas can be represented by schools featuring 
little or no Burmese language teaching, using a curriculum often radically different to 
that of the state, taught in local languages; a more federalist approach would be 
represented by the promotion of mother tongue in schools which also teach Burmese, 
and broadly follow the government curriculum (modified according to local contexts 
and conditions). In relation to school ownership and administration, the former 
positions demand locally-owned schools, administered by ethnic political authorities 
(EAGs, or otherwise); a more federalist approach could also imply non-state school 
ownership, but with a curriculum and regime linked to the government system – or 
could mean greater focus on mother tongue teaching (and instruction in appropriate 
local cultures and history) in schools which could nevertheless be part of the state 
system. In addition to the politics of these positions, important practical 
considerations remain regarding, for example accreditation. 
 
Thus, positions in relation to education can be taken as proxies of different actors' 
views regarding a broader range of state-society issues, and the distribution of power 
and resources, actual and symbolic/cultural capital, between the central government 
and ethnic polities. In this framing, the NMSP (MNEC) model can be seen as 
achieving a fairly high degree of local self-determination in education, while retaining 
strong links to the (hopefully future federal) Union. This was previously the case with 
the KIO system, which under pressure of the resumption of armed conflict seems to 
be moving towards a more separatist model, similar to that adopted historically by the 
KNU (which itself may nevertheless be undergoing significant changes).  
 
Similar mapping may be applied to positions in relation to language use and policy, in 
schools and in governance functions more broadly. Most stakeholders seem to accept 
the necessity (or desirability) of teaching children Burmese (Bama saga). All but the 
most diehard separatists among Myanmar's ethnic nationalists seem willing to 
concede the status of Burmese (Bama saga) as a national/Union language, or lingua 
franca (in some cases, together with English, due to its international status). The 
degree or manner in which Burmese and/or ethnic languages (with the emphasis on 
the plural, as explored below) should be used for public administration, government 
and legal processes are indicators of how different actors view the distribution of 
power between the (Burman) centre and (ethnic) periphery in a reforming Myanmar - 
and might be taken as rough proxies for other sectors, for example in relation to 
natural resource management and revenue sharing and distribution, between the 
Union government and ethnic States. For example, those who seek to use ethnic 
languages as a primary medium of governance and administration in ethnic States can 
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be expected to adopt strong/maximalist positions regarding the degree of natural 
resource revenue and other financial and political goods which should be retained at, 
and/or redistributed to, the local/State level (federalism) – and in extreme cases may 
argue for complete separation of the ethnic polities from the (rump) Union. Moderates 
may adopt positions according to which ethnic languages are used together with 
Burmese, or in a supplementary manner at the State level - corresponding to varying 
degrees of autonomy or decentralisation, including various forms of federalism. 
While such arguments are rarely explicit among ethnic educators, political activist 
more generally, exploring different positions in relation to language and education 
can help to reveal the kind of country people imagine Myanmar to be - and their 
hopes (and concerns) regarding the peace process, and broader political transition. 
 
Within this discussion, further reflection is required on the position of 'minorities 
within minorities' - ethnic communities with different identities (usually reflected in 
different language uses) to those of the locally dominant minority (e.g. Kachin 
linguistic sub-groups, the variety of Karen ethno-linguistic communities), and their 
possible vulnerability in the context of a potentially totalizing dominant local 




The positions of different stakeholders in relation to language policy and use (in 
schools, and governance) indicate positions regarding state-society conflict and 
possible outcomes, more broadly. Schooling in ethnic mother tongues is valuable in a 
multi-ethnic country like Myanmar, for both pedagogic and political reasons. 
Furthermore, non-state (EAG) education regimes are concrete examples of self-
determination for ethnic nationality communities ('federalism from below'), in a 
context where elite-level political discussions around the peace process have yet to 
reach a sustainable conclusion.  
 
Education regimes developed by (or under the authority of) EAGs are shaped by 
peace and conflict dynamics - tending to be more separatist in character when conflict 
is rife, and less separatist (more willing to engage, and perhaps integrate, with state 
systems) when ceasefires are in place. Therefore conflict and peace are key variables 
in shaping education policy and practice in ethnic areas, and education is also a key 
variable in the peace process. However, while current education reforms in Myanmar 
do address issues of mother tongue education and ethnic schooling, to a degree, these 
are largely disconnected from the peace process; likewise, key peace process (EAG 
and government leaders) have thus far paid little attention to issues of education or 
language. The forthcoming elections in Myanmar present opportunity to discuss these 
issues on the national political stage, and bring them onto the (crowded and contested) 
agenda of the future government. Ethnic political parties in Myanmar will have a 
particular role to play in this respect; EAGs and associated civil society actors will 
continue to be important providers of ethnic education, and should be encouraged to 
address these issues more in policy dialogue, and in peace negotiations. Peace in 
Myanmar will only be sustainable if durable solutions are found to language policy 
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